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I. INTRODUCTION
The worse the society, the more law there will be. In Hell there will be
nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed.1
—Grant Gilmore

The dark side of due process has cast a long shadow over civil
procedure, hiding technical legal doctrine within a forbidding aura of
obscurity. One need not go as far as Grant Gilmore’s demonized view of
*
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1. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
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due process to recognize that procedure can complicate and confuse
enforcement of the law. This observation would come as no surprise to
generations of law students, who confronted unfamiliar and esoteric
issues of procedure just as they began law school. Why procedure is
unfamiliar and esoteric is another matter. The reason goes beyond the
fortunate lack of experience most people have with the intricacies of civil
litigation. As Learned Hand observed, “I must say that as a litigant I
should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and
death.”2 We can only hope that civil procedure courses do not generate this
degree of anxiety and intimidation.
The intimidation they do generate arises from a systematic lack of
transparency in the subject. Its opacity is much like the secrecy that Henry
Sidgwick found at the heart of utilitarian morality. A utilitarian, Sidgwick
argued, might approve of an otherwise immoral act in secret because one
or a few such acts would maximize utility, while public approval would
encourage many more such acts, which would cumulatively detract from
utility.3 He drew the following paradoxical conclusion about utilitarianism
as an “esoteric morality”: “the opinion that secrecy may render an action
right which would not otherwise be so should itself be kept comparatively
secret; and similarly it seems expedient that the doctrine that esoteric
morality is expedient should itself be kept esoteric.”4 So, too, procedure
might leave the occasional violation of a right without a remedy, but deny
the remedy secretly so that the right would not be widely violated. And like
a utilitarian, a proceduralist might want to keep the role of procedure in
defeating enforcement secret. Procedure is, to use Sidgwick’s term, esoteric—
not by accident, but by design.
To look at procedure in this light reveals its essential mediating role in
translating the many broadly defined and proliferating rights characteristic
of American law into a workable scheme of enforcement. Not all rights
need to be enforced all the time, and if they were, the system of civil
justice would grind to a halt. Civil procedure provides the necessary brake
against a descent into Gilmore’s underworld composed entirely of law and
due process. It creates a barrier that allows through claims most likely to
be significant and most urgently in need of resolution. All others are screened
out by the cost of litigation, consisting in no small part of the preliminary
stages of procedure—pleading, discovery, and associated motions and
objections.

2. Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in
LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS 1921–1922, at 87, 105 (1926).
3. See generally HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 424–58 (7th ed. 1907).
4. Id. at 490.
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Some have dismissed this role of procedural rules as an exercise in
“plaintiphobia,” exemplified by recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court on pleading, class actions, and arbitration.5 This critique
has much to be said for it so long as it recognizes that it raises questions
of degree, not of kind. Some moderating mechanism remains necessary
to translate any right into a realistic scheme of remedies.6 Such “remedial
equilibration,” explored by Daryl Levinson as a pervasive constraint on
constitutional rights,7 has a more general counterpart in “procedural
equilibration”: the need for procedural rules that select disputes for litigation
and serious settlement negotiations. Principles that determine the content
of rights in the abstract must be moderated by considerations of policy
and feasibility that determine when and how those rights will be enforced.
Procedure does this, paradoxically, by invoking its own set of abstractions
in the form of “due process” and “access to justice.” As articulated and
implemented to favor, respectively, defendants and plaintiffs, these abstractions
cover their own tracks as necessary and pragmatic gatekeepers. As they
disfavor or promote different kinds of claims, they obscure the murky
compromises necessary to decide which cases go forward and which do
not. From this perspective, the problem of procedure operates more as a
feature than as a bug. The problem comes only from the failure to recognize
that it is deliberately obscure.
This gatekeeping function works best when it works invisibly, just like
the esoteric reasoning that Sidgwick found to support a utilitarian justification
for widely accepted moral rules.8 Procedure does the same thing by
creating a veil of fairness and efficiency behind which the vexed and
disquieting business of case selection occurs. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure9 exemplifies this compromise perfectly. Until recently,
Rule 1 stated the aims of the Federal Rules in admirably succinct terms:
“They should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”10 In 2015,
5. See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Plaintiphobia in the Supreme
Court, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 193, 194–98 (2014). See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness
in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers,
125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011).
6. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 858 (1999).
7. Id. at 857–60.
8. See SIDGWICK, supra note 3, at 490.
9. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. (2014) (amended 2015).
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Rule 1 was amended to add that the rules should be “construed, administered,
and employed by the court and the parties” to secure these ends,11 seemingly
demoting the rule proper to mere means to serve the ends identified in
Rule 1. For all its virtues as a concise summary of what the Federal Rules
seek to achieve, this provision cannot be taken literally as a guide to
interpretation. If Rule 1 tries to tell judges how to fill the gaps, resolve
the inconsistencies, and solve the problems created by the other Federal
Rules, it imposes an impossible demand—not just to try to bring some
cases to a conclusion that is, in some respects, “just, speedy, and inexpensive,”
but to “secure” all these ends and to do so in “every action and proceeding.”12
What appears at first glance to be a statement of noble aspirations turns
out on examination to be an utterly unworkable guide to interpretation.
On nearly every current view of the relationship between justice and efficiency,
these two ideals come into conflict whenever individual rights collide with
the interests of society as a whole.13 And even when efficiency is disaggregated
into speed and expense, as they are in Rule 1, tradeoffs between these two
values are inevitable. Overnight express costs more than standard delivery.
Speed might come at the expense of efficiency. In the realm of procedure,
a complex class action requires intricate trade-offs between justice, expense,
and delay for all the parties involved. If taken literally, Rule 1 imposes
demands that are so unattainable as to verge on the incoherent. It cannot
be given a literal interpretation as a canon of construction, so it must mean
something other than what it says.
The key to understanding what it means lies in the recently elaborated
directive to the court and to the parties that the Federal Rules “should be
construed, administered, and employed” to serve the ends that Rule 1
identifies.14 This command extends the influence of Rule 1 throughout
the Federal Rules, and along with it, the inherent tensions identified in the
rule. The leading treatises on federal procedure reach the same conclusion.
They say: “There probably is no provision in the federal rules that is more
important than this mandate. It reflects the spirit in which the rules were
conceived and written, and in which they should be interpreted.”15 And,
“[f]ederal courts often refer to this provision of Rule 1 as a statement of
the fundamental policy that the district courts must follow in applying any
of the Rules in any particular civil action or proceeding: a just, speedy,

11. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
12. Id.
13. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 23–25 (rev. ed. 1999) (describing the
views of “many philosophers”).
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
15. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1029
(4th ed. 2018) (footnote omitted).
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and inexpensive determination is essential to a fair and effective trial.”16
As Professor Robert Bone has said: “Rule 1 is critically important. It sets
out a principle that is supposed to guide interpretation and application of
all the Federal Rules.”17
Even discounting these statements as a celebration of the Federal Rules
as the victor over some long-vanquished version of formalism, they
contain this grain of truth: Rule 1 cannot be minimized or dismissed as a
prelude to the real rules that follow it. Instead, it identifies the “purpose”
of the rules, as its title suggests.18 Yet it does not succeed in identifying a
single consistent purpose, but several contradictory goals, and it leaves
judges to sort out the tensions between them. With the new amendment
to its terms, the rule seeks to enlist the parties to litigation in this effort,
apparently a case-by-case adjustment of the presiding principles of procedural
reform.19 Instead of giving guidance on how to make this adjustment,
Rule 1 just restates the conflicting ambitions that animate the Federal Rules
as a whole. It should come, then, as no surprise that judges have used
their discretion as often to undermine the regime of liberalized procedure
as to support it, and as often to obscure its actual operation as to clarify it.
Discretion itself magnifies the esoteric tendencies in procedure by requiring
a case-specific balance among a variety of different factors. To the extent
they are reflected throughout the Federal Rules, the tensions inherent in
Rule 1 cannot be relieved simply by minimizing its significance, or by
repealing it altogether and leaving the remaining rules intact. The rule,
instead, signals the need for a thorough rethinking of procedural reform.
Now, eighty years after adoption of the Federal Rules, a search for an
alternative vision of procedure has become long overdue—one which
depends less on procedural aspirations and judicial discretion and more
on a candid assessment of which claims deserve to go forward, and which
do not, as a matter of substantive law.
This Article examines the tensions inherent in Rule 1. Part II begins
with attempts to save the rule from itself, by interpreting it as something
else: a preamble, a canon of construction, or a delegation of discretion to
federal judges. Part III proceeds to the sources from which the rule was
16. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.21(1)(a) (3d ed. 2008).
17. Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87
DENV. U.L. REV. 287, 308 (2010).
18. Per its title, Rule 1 provides the “Scope and Purpose” of the Federal Rules. FED.
R. CIV. P. 1.
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
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drawn and the problems that led the rulemakers to draft it the way they
did. Although framed in positive terms that looked forward, the rule had
its immediate effect in negative consequences that looked backward. It
was almost wholly concerned with abolishing common law “technicalities,”
as the rulemakers called them, demoting them to the status of outmoded
relics of a bygone era of legal reasoning, much like the formalities of
“substantive due process” from the Lochner era. Part IV explores the
traces of Rule 1 in other rules, which either explicitly call for a liberal
interpretation or delegate discretion to district judges. These do not
constitute the whole of the rules, most of which define procedural devices,
like those used in discovery and motion practice, and then closely regulate
how and when those devices are to be used. The latter provisions resist
the purposive interpretation commanded by Rule 1, complicating any
interpretation of the rule and the vision of liberalized procedure that it
embodies. Part V then analyzes the handful of decisions in which the
Supreme Court has relied on the rule. Like the terms of the rule itself, these
point in opposite directions—both towards and away from liberalized
procedure. These decisions, as well as those in the lower courts, reveal
the same ambivalence that can be found throughout the rules. Provisions
that counsel the exercise of judicial discretion in favor of liberalized
procedure stand side by side, sometimes in the same rule, with provisions
that admit little interpretative leeway and require strict compliance. Together
they operate, sometimes in mysterious ways, to screen out the cases that
deserve more litigation from those that deserve less, or none at all.
II. SAVING RULE 1
In tone, Rule 1 sounds like a preamble, with distant but discernible
echoes of the Preamble to the Constitution. It sets out lofty goals, among
them a reference to “just” outcomes and it promises “to secure” them just
like the Preamble.20 Judges must aspire to these goals, but no one expects
them to be fulfilled, let alone in every case. The resonant language of
Rule 1 defeats attempts to reframe it in more precise and realistic terms,
as Bone attempted to do in a recent article. He would have required the
rules “be construed and administered to distribute the risk of outcome
error fairly and efficiently with due regard for party participation appropriate
to the case, due process and other constitutional constraints, and practical
limitations on a judge’s ability to predict consequences accurately and assess

20. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 1, with U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the
United States, in Order to . . . establish Justice, . . . promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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system-wide effects.”21 His revision seeks to identify the factors that
should go into interpretation of the rules without any compelling vision of
what the rules seek to achieve.22 If it were frankly identified as a preamble,
or a “prayer” as Patrick Johnston has characterized it,23 it would better serve
as a statement of purpose. To take this step, however, would demote the
operative effect of the rule from a canon that guides interpretation to a
rhetorical preliminary with no force of its own at all.
Other saving strategies can be devised to preserve a degree of consistency
and feasibility in the rule, but they all dilute its operative force. The rule
might be limited to resolving the indeterminacy found in other rules, as
determined by their own terms and other rules of construction. Rule 1
would then play a subsidiary role in filling in the blanks identified by other
means. The range of cases covered by the rule, however, would then
diminish from “every action and proceeding”24 to just those in which
problems with the rules could be independently identified. Moreover, no
reason appears, other than anxiety over the consequences of the rule’s
general application, that would justify its subordination to other principles
of construction. Along the same lines, the rule could be restricted to just
those cases in which a “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination”25 can
be achieved without any trade-off among these values. The rule would
apply only in cases in which other rules failed along all three of these
dimensions. The drafters of the original rules might have found such cases
to be more common, and less difficult to identify, than we do today. If
restricted in this fashion, the rule would come into play in only a narrow
range of seemingly uncontroversial cases, which does not at all fit the
experience under the rule, as recounted later in Part IV. In any event, even
this restrictive proposal would constitute an open-ended invitation to
rewrite any of the other rules whenever their application seemed to defeat
the goals identified in Rule 1.

21. Bone, supra note 17, at 300. The Federal Rules of Evidence contain a similarly
qualified statement of purpose: “These rules should be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the trust may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.” FED. R. EVID. 102.
22. See Bone, supra note 17, at 300–02.
23. See generally Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of
Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325 (1995).
24. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
25. Id.
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The meaning and use of the rule oscillates between these extremes: the
expression of noble goals suitable for a preamble and the identification of
a way to achieve those goals suitable for a legal rule. To follow the former
denies any operational effect to rule. To follow the latter heightens its
problematic relationship with the rest of the rules. Perhaps its short but
sweeping terms contrast too starkly with the detailed provisions found
elsewhere in the rules, on such varied issues as service of process, pleadings,
joinder of claims and parties, discovery, and pretrial and post-trial motions—
many of which were the product of hard-fought compromises when the
rules were first drafted and when they have since been amended. Does Rule
1 trump these detailed provisions or do they trump its abstract statement of
goals? The rule either means too much or too little, resulting in continued
uneasiness over whether it means anything at all.
The uneasiness over these tensions became apparent even before the
Federal Rules took effect. Former Attorney General Mitchell, who did much
to push the rules through, had this to say about Rule 1 at a national conference
introducing the rules to a group of prominent attorneys in the summer of
1938:
The Committee is rather embarrassed about that statement, because its sounds a
little as if it would have that result. (Laughter.) Of course, we know better. The
purpose of that provision was to impress upon the courts the need of giving these
rules such an interpretation as would tend to induce just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action. Many of us would probably not wish to have every
action determined inexpensively. (Laughter.)26

No doubt Mitchell referred to the prospect of reduced attorney’s fees earned
by all the lawyers in attendance at the conference, but he invited the reaction
that the rule could not be taken entirely seriously. Similar concerns
accompanied the process of drafting Rule 1, with one member of the advisory
committee simply referring to it as “bunk.”27 Charles Clark, the principal
drafter of the rules, nevertheless insisted on including a general statement
of purpose in the rule because similar statements were found in other
reformed codes of procedure.28
Scholars of procedure have given Rule 1 the same mixed reception that
it received from those who drafted it. They have endorsed it, but they have
preferred not to dwell on it. They have begun their casebooks and treatises,
not at the beginning of the Federal Rules, or even with the Federal Rules
at all, but with jurisdiction, a topic that directly addresses judicial power
26. AM. BAR ASS’N, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 192 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938).
27. Johnston, supra note 23, at 1344 (quoting Letter from George W. Pepper to William
D. Mitchell (Mar. 8, 1937)).
28. Id. at 1340.
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and its limits.29 Yet the same emphasis can be found just beneath the surface
of Rule 1. The first sentence of the rule defines the coverage of the rules,
extending them to most civil actions in federal court, and the second
sentence then empowers judges to give a liberal, purposive interpretation
to the rules. Who else will determine what constitutes “the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”? And who
else will determine how the rules “should be construed and administered”?
The operative effect of the rule, to the extent that it can be ascertained at
all, is to leave the hard questions of procedure to the discretion of judges.
That judgment made good sense in 1938, when the rulemakers were
preoccupied with the task of eliminating common law procedure. It makes
less sense today, when we have the benefit of decades of experience under
the rules and under new forms of substantive law scarcely imaginable
when the rules were adopted. The next part of this Article turns to the origins
of the rule.
III. SOURCES OF RULE 1
The original terms of Rule 1 were even more succinct than the current
version. They required that the rules “shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” In recent years,
the terms “proceedings” and “administered”30 were added to the rule, giving
it a slightly bureaucratic air, which departed from the original intent of the
rule to invoke earlier efforts at litigation reform.31 The Advisory Committee
note cites earlier statutes and the Equity Rules of 1912,32 which permitted
amendments to cure defects of form.33 These sources sound the theme,
repeated constantly by advocates for the new rules, that “technicalities”
should not get in the way of “substantial justice.” As this distinction was

29. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS,
at ix, ch. 2 (11th ed. 2013) (entitling the first chapter after the introduction as “Jurisdiction
Over the Parties or Their Property”); FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &
JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE, at x, ch. 2 (5th ed. 2001) (entitling the first chapter
after the introduction as “Proper Court in a Civil Action”).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
31. Johnston, supra note 23, at 1327–30.
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note from 1937. The Advisory Committee’s
entire discussion of the provision reads as follows: “With the second sentence compare
U.S.C., Title 28, [former] §§ 777 (Defects of form; amendments), 767 (Amendment of
process); Equity Rule 19 (Amendments generally).” Id.
33. See FED. EQUITY R. 35 (1912) (superseded 1938).
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deployed, technicalities were associated with the common law and they
were to be overcome by reliance upon the rules of equity.34 Partly, this
appeal to equity was strategic, because the Equity Rules of 1912 served as
a model of simplified procedure accomplished through judicial rulemaking,
but partly it reflected the dependence of the Federal Rules on distinctive
equity procedures, notably discovery. “Equitable discretion”35 as a form
of judicial power figures in this mix of objectives, but as we shall see,
more in framing what the rules rejected rather than what they endorsed.
By its own terms, Rule 1 serves only an auxiliary role in the interpretation
of some other rule, and in that role, it is addressed primarily to judges.
They are asked to forsake the technicalities of the common law and to
construe the Federal Rules accordingly. This narrow focus fits with the
concern of the rulemakers to educate judges in a new system of procedure
and to prevent backsliding to the technicalities of common law procedure.
They did not want to repeat the experience under the Field Code, in which
procedural reform could not overcome the inertia of established practices
and attitudes.36 The message of Rule 1 was essentially negative: Do not return
to the familiar rules of the common law.
For that reason, Professor James William Moore, who assisted in drafting
the rules, characterized this provision in seemingly paradoxical terms, as
the first among many in the rules that “temper the discretionary power of
the court with instructions as to the liberality of its application, ‘to the end
that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to
the substantive rights of the parties.’”37 This advice takes the rule in two
different directions. On the one hand, it rightly recognizes the managerial
discretion that judges need to keep control over cases with any degree of
complexity. The exercise of such discretion requires a balance among the
competing goals identified in the rule, with little to constrain judges in
how they strike the balance among those goals. So, on the other hand, Moore
reads the rule to “temper” judicial discretion in favor of a liberal interpretation,38
which presupposes a background of technical rules that can be dispensed
with. These are the rules of common law procedure that do not serve “the
substantive rights of the parties.”39 Rule 1, and the Federal Rules as a whole,
34. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 953 (1987).
35. Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable
Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1379, 1399–1410 (2015).
36. See Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Procedure I: The
Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 390–91 (1935).
37. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE & JOSEPH FRIEDMAN, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 1.13
(1st ed. 1938) (quoting ILL. CIV. PRAC. ACT § 4 (1937)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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succeeded admirably in abolishing those rules. The ill-defined discretion
that was left behind as a substitute has proved to be more problematic,
giving rise to problems that have plagued the Federal Rules to this day.
Professor Moore, in the first edition of his treatise on the Federal Rules,
elaborates upon the purpose of Rule 1 in remarkably specific terms. He
identifies three purposes for the rule: first, to abrogate the maxim that
statutes in derogation of the common law were to be narrowly construed;
second, to establish a principle of harmless error; and third, as noted earlier,
to limit the discretion of trial judges in favor of a liberal interpretation of
the rules.40 Avoiding a narrow construction of the rules allowed them
to supersede procedures under the common law writs, just as the Rules
Enabling Act provided that the rules superseded preexisting statutes with
which they were inconsistent.41 Other rules specifically abolished particular
common law writs, notably Rule 242—to be discussed shortly—and the
particular form that objections had to take.43 Establishing a principle
of harmless error was also the subject of a separate rule, Rule 61, which
Moore elevated to the status of “the chief provision in the Federal Rules
with respect to the interpretation of the Rules and instructions for the
guidance of the court in applying the Rules.”44 That rule required the court
to “disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which [did] not affect
the substantial rights of the parties.”45 These first two purposes make it
easier to understand what Moore meant by the third purpose: constraining
the discretion of the court. Judges were to decide cases without regard to
errors purely of form, like those recognized by the common law. They were
denied the discretion to decide cases based on “technicalities,” concerned
only with the way that claims and defenses, motions, and objections were
40. Id. The same purposes were canvassed in the advisory committee’s deliberations
over the drafting of the rule. Johnston, supra note 23, at 1336–37, 1340–41, 1346.
41. Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 2. This rule recognized only “one form of action—the civil action,”
rather than the variety of forms of action at common law. Id. Rule 81(b) specifically abolished
other writs. FED. R. CIV. P. 81 (abolishing scire facias and mandamus). After 1948, Rule
60(e) abolished others. FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (abolishing writs of coram nobis, coram vobis,
and audita querela, in addition to the equity bills of review and bills in the nature of bills
of review).
43. See FED. R. CIV. P. 46.
44. MOORE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 37.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 61. (2006) (amended 2007). Rule 61 reads much the same way
today, although one reference to substantial justice in the rule has been shortened simply
to “justice.” FED. R. CIV. P. 61.
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presented. “Substantial rights,” by contrast, were those concerned with the
merits. Glossed in terms of these purposes, Rule 1 had a perfectly definite,
if predominantly negative, purpose: to clear away the unnecessary details
of common law procedure.
What was to replace it were the equity procedures that applied to all
claims by virtue of Rule 2, which merged actions in equity with those at
law.46 For Charles Clark, merger of law and equity was the key to procedural
reform, and from this perspective, the terms of Rule 1 served primarily to
safeguard the achievements of Rule 2.47 In the legislative debates leading
up to the passage of the Rules Enabling Act in 1934, the issue of merger
came up repeatedly and eventually was resolved in favor of combining
law and equity.48 While preserving the right to jury trial, the act provided
that “[t]he court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it
for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of
civil action and procedure for both.”49 Chief Justice Hughes followed up
this grant of authority with the announcement that the Court had decided
to act to unify law and equity, an announcement greeted by Charles Clark
and James Moore with genuine enthusiasm.50
The immediate objective of merger now seems irrefutable: to dissolve
the distinction between the “sides” of the federal court, with actions at law
governed by state procedure under the conformity acts and actions in equity
governed by the federal rules of equity. The conformity acts themselves
established different benchmarks for state procedure, initially requiring
“static conformity” to state procedures fixed in the past and then dynamic
conformity with current state procedures,51 but in each case creating a drastic
contrast between state-to-state variations on the law side and nation-wide
uniformity on the equity side.52 Much therefore depended upon which side
of the federal court should hear a case, with the risk of mistaken filings on
one side or the other. As with the abolition of common law technicalities,
abolition of this preliminary distinction made eminent good sense, but it,
too, left open the question of what would replace the old procedural rules.

46. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (“There is one form of action–the civil action.”). Since
1966, this rule has extended to admiralty cases. 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 1014.
47. See Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure II:
Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1291–92 (1935).
48. See, e.g., 78 CONG. REC. 9362, 10,866 (1934).
49. Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
50. See Clark & Moore, supra note 47, at 1291–92.
51. See Clark & Moore, supra note 36, at 399–401.
52. See, e.g., Clark & Moore, supra note 47, at 1299–1300.
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Clark, and his then assistant, Moore, argued for reform based on the model
of the Equity Rules of 1912.53 Those rules, according to an influential
account at the time, departed from previous rules “in the direction of
simplifying the pleadings, speeding causes for hearing, and lessening the
cost of taking testimony, and of appeal.”54 The model of equity procedure
was not taken from historical equity practice, which had been “constantly
criticized, lampooned and ridiculed because of the complexity and delays
of its procedure,” leading to reforms first in England and then here.55 The
story of “how equity conquered common law” has been recounted elsewhere,
with the perceptive caveat that equity has not managed to keep a secure
hold on all the territory it conquered.56 It might have won the war, but lost
the peace or, more accurately, become part of a hybrid regime that combined
elements previously associated with both law and equity. The selective
influence of equity on procedure as we know it today has its counterpart in
the selective version of equity that became the model for the Federal Rules.
That version of equity also had a basis in the reformed state codes of
procedure. Those codes provided for unification of equity and law, and
the drafters of the Federal Rules referred to these provisions as well as to
statements in the codes that anticipated the provisions of Rule 1.57 In other
respects, the state codes were already binding on the federal courts under
the regime of dynamic conformity for actions at law,58 and so the drafters
of the rules could invoke the principles of the reformed state codes to
support reform at the federal level. Those principles only went so far,
however. Rejecting the technicalities of the common law in favor of
reformed procedures in equity still left federal judges with the need to
determine what were the substantial rights now protected under the new,
merged procedure. What the reformed state codes and the Equity Rules
of 1912 rejected as the basis for procedural rulings was clearer than what
they accepted, which could be worked out only as judges exercised their
discretion under the new rules.

53. See generally Clark & Moore, supra note 36, at 415–35.
54. JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES: PROMULGATED BY
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AT THE OCTOBER TERM, 1912, at 34 (7th ed. 1930).
55. Id. at 7, 35–36.
56. See generally Subrin, supra note 34.
57. See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 advisory committee’s note from 1937; MOORE & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 37.
58. See Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
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The triumph of equity at this point seemed to endorse “equitable discretion”
as a fundamental feature of the Federal Rules. Moore, as we have seen,
denied that the rules gave unlimited discretion to judges, but insisted, instead,
that they required judges to give a liberal interpretation to the rules.59 He
might well have made this point to defuse the historic objection to equity,
repeated by opponents of the rules, that it gave too much power to judges.60
That objection took on added force with the restrictions that the rules
placed on the right to jury trial.61 Although the rules could not override
the requirements of the Seventh Amendment,62 as the Rules Enabling Act
itself emphasized,63 they did put obstacles in the way of obtaining a jury
trial, primarily by setting very short time limits on seeking a jury trial after
the close of pleading on an issue.64 Although the time limit was recently
lengthened to fourteen days, it was originally ten days.65 Clark and Moore
were particularly concerned that “[t]o make the procedure completely
workable, there should be adequate provisions for waiver of trial by jury.”66
In the absence of a timely demand, and in all cases in equity, the judge alone
decided the case.67 So, too, as pretrial proceedings became more complicated
through liberalized pleading, joinder, and discovery, judges had more
occasions to exercise a wider range of discretion. Contrary to what Moore
asserted, the liberal approach to procedure did not constrain but expanded
the scope of judicial discretion.
Clark himself worried about this tendency under the rules. Although
his emphasis always was on avoiding technicalities, he readily conceded
the role of determinate rules in establishing a system of procedure:
The necessity of procedure in the sense of regularized conduct of litigation is obvious.
Court trials, like other matters of human conduct involving continually recurring
processes, must be systematized. In no other way can a great volume of business
be done at all. In no other way can it be fairly done. If there are no rules upon
which suitors can depend or rely, they can be trapped or misled, while the favored
friends of the tribunal are securing special treatment.68

59. See MOORE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 37.
60. See Subrin, supra note 34, at 926, 928, 999.
61. See Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (“That in such union
of rules the right of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment
to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.”).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
63. See Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
64. See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(b) advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendment.
65. Id.
66. See Clark & Moore, supra note 47, at 1297.
67. See id. at 1297–98.
68. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297, 299, 303 (1938).
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Just as Clark’s endorsement of equity practice selectively focused on
reformed equity practice, his complaint with the common law focused on
its perception and use as an unreformed system of rigid rules.69 Although
the common law allowed certain forms of general pleading, it was perceived
as a system of rigid rules.70 Clark’s allegiance was not with equity over law
but with substance over technicalities. He admonished against making “the
mistake our forefathers made as to equity. They believed its process could
be formless, until at length they found that they were caught in technicalities
more rigid than ever found in law.”71 The correct balance for Clark required
both definite rules and flexible application, even if he inclined at crucial
points to favor the latter over the former.72
Such ambivalence over the form that procedural rules should take gave
still greater scope to judicial discretion, either because particular rules
delegated discretion to the judge or because the judge decided whether
definite rules had to give way to indefinite standards. The fundamental need
was to adapt the procedural system to the changing demands upon the legal
system:
The trend of procedural rules towards undue rigidity is often at variance with
a developing substantive law. New political and economic forces are likely to force
new relationships between persons, and new governmental attempts to control
such relationships, while the process of enforcement becomes ever slower and
more cumbersome.73

Because procedure was “the handmaid of justice,”74 in Clark’s antiquated
phrase, it had a purely instrumental role—to serve ends given from outside
the system of rules itself.75 These came predominantly from substantive
law, as Clark indicated in the passage just quoted, but could also come from
constitutional rights. A judgment entered without notice and opportunity
to be heard violates the Due Process Clause,76 and for that reason, denies

69. See id. at 300–09.
70. See id. (“Lawyers and judges in the old days might appear to worship form and
obey formal rules. Yet they had a penchant for getting things done, and so they used the
rules, with the aid now and then of some convenient fiction or subterfuge, to accomplish
results without unnecessary trouble.”).
71. Id. at 303.
72. See Subrin, supra note 34, at 964, 976.
73. Clark, supra note 68, at 300.
74. See generally id.
75. See Bone, supra note 17, at 291.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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“substantial justice,”77 even though it involves a purely procedural right.
The same holds true of denial of the right to jury trial. Clark did not believe
that denial of these constitutional rights—procedural though they are—
amounted to mere technicalities.78 On the contrary, he found notice and
opportunity to be heard to be fundamental to all procedural systems: “notice
to the defendant and opportunity to present his side of the case is an essential
to the beginning of a lawsuit.”79 His instrumental approach to procedure
did not—and indeed, could not—deny inherently procedural values, which
implicated “substantial rights.”80
That concession further complicates the already problematic distinction
between substance and procedure. In 1938, the then-recent decision in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins81 had raised related questions about the scope
and validity of the Federal Rules, so much so that it might have figured in
the opposition of Justice Brandeis—the author of Erie—to adoption of the
Federal Rules.82 The Rules Enabling Act provided that the “rules shall neither
abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant.”83 It is
a commonplace now that the distinction between “substance” and “procedure”
can be drawn at different points for different purposes, as can the distinction
between “substantive rights” and “substantial rights.” Putting all the intricacies
of these distinctions to one side, they underline the still more basic point
that the distinctions themselves are historically conditioned and dependent
upon legal context. Clark’s entire approach to procedure presupposed that
judges could adjust to changed circumstances to draw the correct distinction
77. Int’l. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945).
78. See CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 73 (2d ed.
1947).
79. Id. Clark failed to cover service of process and jurisdiction at greater length in
his book on code pleading only because these topics fell outside the narrow scope of the
subject. See id. at 75. He elaborated a little on the need for notice and opportunity to be
heard at the conference on the Federal Rules, where he expressed his opposition to service
by publication because “generally speaking, in the federal courts service by publication to
acquire jurisdiction is not allowed by statute.” AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 26, at 382.
80. For an analysis of the “substantial rights” that justify reversal of a judgment
under the current version of Rule 61, see 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 2883 (3d ed.
2012).
81. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
82. The Federal Rules were transmitted to Congress on December 20, 1937, after
certiorari had been granted in Erie on October 11, 1937, and before it was decided April 25,
1938. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 135–36 (2000) (citations omitted). Justice Brandeis voted against approving the
rules, based on his belief—like that underlying Erie—that they were an example of “unnecessary
centralization” and federal law. Id. at 169 (citing LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS–A PROFESSION
135–37 (1914)).
83. Rules Enabling Act, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)).
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between technicalities and substantial rights. Yet circumstances changed
with Erie84 even as the Federal Rules were being adopted. Several decades
later, with the benefit of hindsight, we can see that drawing this distinction
—and the related distinction between procedure and substance—invited
yet another exercise of judicial discretion.
The Federal Rules did limit that discretion but not in the broadly framed
terms of Rule 1. These invited almost any compromise between the
unproblematic goals that the rule identifies. Tradeoffs between the just,
speedy, or inexpensive determination of a case can be made at any point
in the proceedings along several different dimensions. If Rule 1 entrenched
judicial discretion at the foundation in the Federal Rules, other provisions
sought to limit it, either to certain key stages of litigation or by defining
and regulating specific procedural steps. The next part of this Article goes
into how these other rules relate to one another and to the vision of procedural
justice embodied in the rules as a whole.
IV. DISCRETION IN A REGIME OF RULES
Scattered provisions throughout the rules repeat the command of Rule
1 in more specific terms. We have already seen how Rule 61, on harmless
error, implements the general principles of liberalized procedure in concrete
form.85 Errors “that do not affect any party’s substantial rights” should
not affect the outcome of a case.86 Similar provisions appear elsewhere
in the Federal Rules, in crucial provisions on pleading, joinder, discovery,
and pretrial conference, giving the judge discretion to control pretrial
proceedings, whether it is exercised or not. To focus exclusively on these
provisions, however, would neglect the many others that assume a far more
directive role. Some are even shorter than Rule 1 and more peremptory.
For example, Rule 3 provides that an action is commenced “by filing a
complaint with the court.”87 It leaves no room for the exercise of discretion
and little for interpretation.88
Many other rules engage in the complex task of defining exactly what
a procedural device consists of, such as the rules identifying the stages of
pleading and discovery. If any discretion results from the operation of
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
See supra p. 11.
FED. R. CIV. P. 61.
FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
See infra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.

17

RUTHERGLEN (DO NOT DELETE)

3/5/2019 11:14 AM

rules such as these, it does so indirectly, because the rules prolong and
complicate an action so that the need for judicial management increases.
This kind of structural discretion plays a prominent role early in litigation.
As a case approaches trial or judgment, however, the liberalizing tendencies
of the rules diminish dramatically. For instance, under Rule 16(e), a “court
may modify the order issued after a final pretrial conference only to prevent
manifest injustice,”89 and under Rule 60, it may modify a judgment only
on the grounds and subject to the time limits specified in that rule.90
Although the latter rule nominally recognizes “any other reason that justifies
relief” and “an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,”91
these grounds have been very narrowly construed.92 Judicial discretion has
less and less scope as a case comes closer to resolution. More exacting rules
take over at that point.
Pleading has long received the most attention as the stage early in litigation
that exemplifies the liberal approach of the Federal Rules. Rule 8(e)
establishes a general principle of liberal interpretation of the pleadings: they
“must be construed so as to do justice,”93 or as the rule originally read,
“substantial justice.”94 Rule 15(a) follows up by giving the court discretion
to grant leave to amend, adding the admonition that “[t]he court should
freely give leave when justice so requires.”95 And like Rule 1, these rules
are clearer in what they reject than in what they accept. They abolish the
common law requirement of strict adherence to the forms of action. They
leave the positive content of the pleadings to Rule 8(a), whose key provision
requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”96 The Supreme Court—to the consternation
of many procedure scholars—recently read this rule in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly97 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal to require that a complaint “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.”98 Critics of these decisions rightly

89. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e).
90. FED. R. CIV. P. 60.
91. Id.
92. 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 80, § 2857 (“The cases calling for great liberality
in granting Rule 60(b) motions, for the most part, have involved default judgments.”).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(f) (2006) (amended 2007).
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). Rule 15 also abolishes the common law doctrine of
variance, which prevented evidence at trial from going outside the issues identified by the
pleadings. See BENJAMIN J. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING 432 (3d
ed. 1923). The rule states that amendments should be freely permitted at trial “when doing
so will aid in presenting the merits and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the
evidence would prejudice that party’s action or defense on the merits.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
97. 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
98. 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 576).
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point out that any such requirement is inconsistent with the liberal approach
to pleading espoused by Clark and the other original rulemakers.99 What
the critics only implicitly acknowledge is the indeterminacy of the original
rule, which in most respects has remained unchanged. Rule 8(a) does not
say what “showing” an entitlement to relief amounts to.100 Nor does Rule
8(e) say what “justice” requires.101 That must be filled in by the judges.
It should come as no surprise that, after seventy-five years of experience under
the rules, that the Supreme Court has a different vision of justice than
the rulemakers originally had.
The same resort to discretion to fill in the positive content of the rules,
with the same consequences for evolving interpretation of the rules, can
be found in those on discovery and pretrial conference. Discovery under
the Federal Rules has always proceeded under the assumption that the
parties can work out most of their disputes themselves. This expectation,
however, has been disappointed as often as it has been fulfilled, leading to
continued revision of the rules on discovery. Through all of these changes,
one feature of the rules has remained constant: judges would step in and
exercise their discretion to solve the problems that the parties could not.
Under the original rules, the authority for the judge to do so appeared in
rules governing particular discovery devices and sanctions for discovery
violations.102 It has since been consolidated in the general provisions on
discovery in Rule 26, which give judges plenary authority to assess the burden,
extent, manner, and timing of discovery,103 augmenting the authority granted
by more specific rules on discovery.104 Uniting the provisions on discovery
with those on pretrial conference, the rules now require the parties to confer

99. See SCOTT DODSON, NEW PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 3–5 (2013)
(contrasting “Old Pleading” under the Federal Rules with “New Pleading” under Twombly
and Iqbal).
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
102. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b), (d) (1934) (amended 1970) (protecting parties and
deponents and terminating depositions); FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1934) (amended 1980) (requiring a
motion and good cause for production of documents); FED. R. CIV. P. 35 (1934) (amended
1970) (requiring a motion and good cause for medical exams); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (1934)
(amended 1970) (covering sanctions).
103. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)–(d).
104. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d) (regulating length of depositions); FED. R. CIV. P.
33(a) (limiting number of interrogatories); FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (describing sanctions); FED.
R. CIV. P. 45(c) (regulating subpoenas).
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on a scheduling order105 and the court to issue one early in the action.106
This conference is in addition to the final pretrial conference ordered at
the court’s discretion.107 At the end of a long list of subjects that address
nearly every aspect of litigation, a pretrial conference can consider “facilitating
in other ways the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action.”108
Pretrial conferences began as an entirely optional matter under the original
rules,109 but have now become a standard form of case management. As
with discovery, judicial discretion has not diminished, but expanded into
a routine feature of federal procedure.
The rules on joinder have a similar, although more uneven, history. The
current Federal Rules contain the same liberal and discretionary provisions
for some forms of joinder, but not others. Rule 21 gives the court nearly
unlimited power to “at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.”110 The
court can “also sever any claim against a party.”111 Rule 42 continues in
the same vein by providing for consolidation of cases that “involve a common
question of law or fact” and granting the court the power to “issue any other
orders to avoid unnecessary cost or delay.”112 The court can also order
separate trials of separate issues “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or
to expedite and economize”113 or “to protect a party against embarrassment,
delay, expense, or other prejudice that arises from including a person against
whom the party asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against the
party.”114 The parties themselves can liberally join claims against each other,
to the extent that any claim may be joined with any other,115 and they can
join claims against new parties arising out of the same transaction or occurrence
and presenting a common issue of law or fact.116 As joinder moves from
permissive to mandatory, however, it becomes more difficult. Intervention
by third-parties, addition of necessary parties, and especially certification

105. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).
107. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e).
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c).
109. See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 26, at 299. At the conference on the Federal
Rules, one of the drafters, Edson Sunderland, responded to a question about why pretrial
conferences were discretionary in these terms: “Because if the district judges didn’t like
it, it wouldn’t work anyway. (Laughter.)” Id.
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
111. Id.
112. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a).
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b).
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(b).
115. See FED. R. CIV. P. 18.
116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a). A defendant can join a third-party defendant only if
an additional requirement is met: the new party “is or may be liable to it for all or part of
the claim against it.” FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a).

20

POST RUTHERGLEN PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 56: 1, 2019]

3/5/2019 11:14 AM

The Problem with Procedure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

of class actions, must overcome significant hurdles.117 But once additional
parties are before the court, their presence calls for the exercise of increased
judicial management. In class actions under Rule 23, the judge has broad
authority over the conduct of the action, appointment of class counsel, and
approval of settlements.118 The rules on joinder teach the same basic lesson
as those on pleading, discovery, and pre-trial conferences: As a case becomes
more complicated, the need for judicial discretion correspondingly increases.
This process must come to an end at some point, although not at the
same point in every case. Cases can cross the line between “technicalities”
and “substantial justice” as early as a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, which raises questions of judicial power and due process, or
as late as a claim of harmless error, which can result in entry of a judgment
despite errors earlier in the proceedings. Once this line is crossed, however,
the tenor of the rules changes abruptly. Liberality and structural discretion
yield to simplification and finality. As we have already seen, pretrial
conferences, although permeated with discretion, result in an order that
can be changed only to prevent “manifest injustice.”119
Motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 now fall firmly on the
side of substantial justice.120 Although they were not always thought to do
so, they resemble motions for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50—
formerly known as motions for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding
the verdict—in their dependence on evidence and the substantive law.121
Less frequently noticed, but equally important, is their resemblance to
final pretrial orders.122 They represent the last chance to impose some structure
upon a case before it proceeds to trial, or more likely, serious settlement
negotiations. Partial summary judgment, in particular, operates in much
the same fashion as a pretrial order defining the issues that remain in the
case.123 Discretion in the sense either of freedom to decide regardless of
legal rules or immunity from appellate review plays no role on summary
judgment.124 The same could also be said of motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, but in the absence of a significant probability that dismissal
117. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 19; FED. R. CIV. P. 23; FED. R. CIV. P. 24.
118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)–(e), (g).
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e).
120. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
121. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 56, with FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
122. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 56, with FED. R. CIV. P. 16(e).
123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
124. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754–
55 (1982).
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actually will be granted, a motion on this ground has little chance of narrowing
the case or bringing it to a conclusion. Before the recent decisions imposing
a requirement of plausibility, motions to dismiss did not do nearly as much
to reduce the complexity of litigation or the resulting need for judges to
exercise discretion as the case continued.
Upon examination, many provisions in the Federal Rules not directly
concerned with dispositive motions operate in the same manner as Rule
56. Rule 3, as noted earlier, specifies that an “action is commenced by
filing.”125 Rule 5(d)126 and Rule 6127 then go into detail on what constitutes
filing and how time is to be computed. Rule 4 specifies the manner and
effectiveness of service of process.128 Rule 7129 and Rule 10 identify the
pleadings and the form they must take130 and Rule 11(c) specifies the sanctions
that may be imposed for improper pleading and motion practice.131 All
these provisions define the pleading stage of litigation and regulate it in
a manner that only occasionally allows for judicially approved departures.132
Such examples could be multiplied, illustrating the pervasiveness of technical
provisions in the rules, which often have a decisive effect on the outcome
of litigation. Motions to dismiss for failure to satisfy the statute of limitations,
or for improper service of process, or for sanctions because of baseless
pleadings are all largely determined by these provisions. Yet no one would
deny that they implicate matters of substantial justice rather than mere
technicalities: the time limits for filing suit, the need for adequate notice,
and punishment for misbehavior in litigation.
Clark crusaded against procedural rules that no longer served present
purposes, but he did not identify technicalities any more precisely. The
Federal Rules seem to leave further elaboration to judicial discretion, but
that, too, remains systematically ambiguous. It might refer either to the
discretion of individual judges in particular cases or to the discretion exercised
by judges in the judicial system as a whole.133 The former alternative risks
begging the question in favor of ad hoc exceptions to clear-cut rules, eroding
the very advantage that such rules were originally sought to achieve.

125. FED. R. CIV. P. 3.
126. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d).
127. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6.
128. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4.
129. FED. R. CIV. P. 7.
130. See FED. R. CIV. P. 10.
131. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
132. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m) (permitting time for service of process to be extended
for “good cause”); FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) (extending time “for good cause”); FED. R. CIV. P.
7(a) (allowing a reply to answer “if the court orders one”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (providing
that a court “may impose” sanctions in narrowly defined circumstances).
133. See Friendly, supra note 124, at 754–55.
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A judge who held that justice would be served by finding a complaint filed
one day late to be timely would defeat the clarity the statute of limitations
and Rule 3 were designed to achieve. The latter alternative accommodates
the Federal Rules to shifting conceptions of substantial justice without
posing the problem of the variable exercise of discretion by different judges.
And the Supreme Court has in fact pursued this course in diversity cases
when state law provides an action is commenced by service of process,
reading into the rule an exception to safeguard substantive rights under state
law.134 Rule 1 works best when it works least at the level of individual judges
and instead ratifies the interpretive powers of the judiciary as a whole. It
entrenches these powers, as the next part discusses in detail, but ironically,
not the vision of liberal procedure contemplated by the original rulemakers.
On the contrary, it opens that vision up to reconsideration of how it serves
contemporary conceptions of the ultimate ends of a procedural system.
V. RULE 1 IN THE COURTS
As a rule for interpreting other rules, we should not expect Rule 1 to
appear by itself in judicial opinions. By its own terms, it has to operate
with other provisions in the Federal Rules or, occasionally, with other
sources of law. Nevertheless, its pairing with other rules readily gives rise
to suspicions that it does not make any difference by itself. It might be
that the other rule, and the considerations intrinsic to its interpretation, actually
determine the outcome. In this respect, Rule 1 might resemble the “rule
of lenity” in criminal cases, whose actual influence seems to be inversely
proportional to the number of times it is cited.135 When a court gives a
lenient interpretation to a criminal statute, it finds other reasons for doing
so; and when it does not, it also finds other reasons for failing to do so.
The resemblance between Rule 1 and the rule of lenity has some truth to
it. Neither rule guarantees a liberal interpretation, of procedural rules in
one case or criminal laws in the other. Rule 1 has been invoked to support
the regime of liberal procedure under the original rules, but it also has
been invoked to revise that regime. Given the broad terms in which it is
cast, it could hardly escape the destabilizing interpretations that it invites.
134. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751–52 (1980) (citations omitted);
Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949) (citations omitted).
135. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV.
345, 382–89 (1995) (explaining the “rule of lenity” ranks low in conventions for interpreting
federal criminal statutes).
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The Supreme Court has relied upon Rule 1 in only a handful of decisions,
which can be more or less equally divided between those taking a liberal
approach and those taking a restrictive approach. The decisions that emphasize
the need for a “just” determination tend to be favorable to plaintiffs while
those that emphasize a “speedy” and “inexpensive” determination tend to
favor defendants.136 The latter have predominated in recent years, as has
the use of Rule 1 by the lower federal courts to enhance their role in managing
litigation.137 This role was confirmed by amendments in 1993 that added
“administered” to the terms of the rule, so that the other rules “should
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”138 Administration need
not work exclusively to the benefit of either plaintiffs or defendants, although
it does work to increase the discretion of the district court. The contrary trend,
evident in the recent decisions on pleading, runs against judicial management
as the substitute for definite rules of procedure.139 These decisions effectively
move discretion upward from the trial court to the appellate courts, which
have now taken on a larger role in determining the sufficiency of pleadings.
Rule 1 made its initial appearance in the Supreme Court in decisions on
the negative accomplishments of the Federal Rules and, in particular, on
the consequences of the merger of law and equity. Before the merger, rulings
on equitable defenses to actions at law would have counted as appealable
orders granting or denying an injunction. After the merger, such rulings
looked like any interlocutory order which, because it lacked finality, created
the risk of multiple, piecemeal appeals in a single case. This result contradicted
both Rule 2 on merger and Rule 1 insofar as it required efficient litigation.
The argument to this effect at first received a mixed reception in the Supreme
Court140 but eventually prevailed over traditional doctrine premised on
dividing a single federal court into a “law” side and an “equity” side.141
Another early decision recognized the liberal approach to amendment
under the rules, rejecting the consequences of mistaken pleading at common
law. Foman v. Davis reversed a decision that denied leave to amend a

136. Bone, supra note 17, at 293, 297.
137. See id. at 294.
138. Id. at 287, 294 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
139. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684–86 (2009) (rejecting “careful case
management” approach as an alternative to stricter pleading standards (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007))); Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and
the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 900–03, 905, 908 (2009).
140. Compare Ettelson v. Metro. Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188, 191 (1942) (rejecting argument
against appealability based on Rule 1), with City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S.
254, 257–58 (1949) (accepting the argument).
141. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 283–84 (1988).
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complaint.142 The Court recognized that granting leave to amend was within
the discretion of the district court under Rule 15(a), but it gave priority to
the requirement that leave be “freely given.”143 As much as any other
decision, Foman reveals the complicated relationship between liberal
procedure and discretion. On the one hand, it required the court to neglect
mistakes that do not affect the merits of the action.144 On the other hand,
it necessitated a decision by the court about what constitutes the merits of
the case, and to the extent it is allowed to go forward, it required the exercise
of further discretion at a later stage, such as discovery, which requires judicial
management.145
Another decision along the same lines is Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,
which reversed the dismissal of a derivative action.146 The dismissal had
been based on the named plaintiff’s verification of the complaint, under
what is now Rule 23.1,147 despite inadequate knowledge of its factual basis.148
The Court found the knowledge of the attorneys assisting the plaintiff to
be sufficient, paraphrasing the terms of Rule 1, without explicitly citing
it.149 The Court reasoned:
The basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice through fair trials,
not through summary dismissals as necessary as they may be on occasion. These
rules were designed in large part to get away from old procedural booby traps
which common-law pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated litigants from
ever having their day in court.150

Like Foman, Surowitz denied discretion to the district court in some respects—
to inquire too closely into verification of the complaint—and augmented
it in others—by requiring the derivative action to go forward to a stage
requiring judicial management.
142. 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The Court also required the notice of appeal to be
liberally construed for much the same reasons, although notices of appeal technically fall
within the scope of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Compare id., with FED. R.
APP. P. 3.
143. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. The provision now reads that “[t]he court should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Courts continue to rely
upon Rule 1 to support liberal amendment of the pleadings. See McCauley v. City of Chicago,
671 F.3d 611, 628 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
144. See Foman, 371 U.S. at 181–82 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).
145. See id. at 182.
146. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1966).
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
148. See Surowitz, 383 U.S. at 367.
149. See id. at 365.
150. Id. at 373.
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The Supreme Court’s turn away from the negative aims to the positive
aims of the Federal Rules also signaled a turn away from decisions tending
to favor plaintiffs and prolonging litigation to decisions with the opposite
effect. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett151 is the leading decision in this change of
direction. It also accounts for much of the popularity that Rule 1 has
subsequently enjoyed in the lower courts.152 The Supreme Court quoted
the rule in support of the proposition that summary judgment “is properly
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral
part of the Federal Rules as a whole.”153 The decision made it clear that a
defendant, who did not have the burden of proof at trial, could prevail on
summary judgment by pointing to the absence of evidence that the plaintiff
had to produce in support of a crucial element in her case.154 Failure to
produce sufficient evidence went directly to the merits of the plaintiff’s
claim, unlike a defect in pleading that could be cured by amendment. The
Court re-examined the balance among the ends identified in Rule 1 and
found that they favored increased use of summary judgment under Rule
56.155 In many subsequent decisions, the lower federal courts have cited
Celotex and quoted its interpretation of Rule 1.156
In other decisions of the Supreme Court, Rule 1 made incidental
appearances. It has been equated with the requirements of due process157
and cited as a reason to control costs assessed against a losing party.158 It
has functioned also to enhance judicial control over discovery,159 as well as
to support—or at least not contradict—a literal reading of other rules.160 In
all these cases, the rule might be dismissed as a makeweight. It could hardly

151. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
152. See 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 1029, at 170 n.17.
153. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
154. See id. at 322–23.
155. See id. at 327.
156. 4 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 1029, at 170 n.17.
157. See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 465–66 (2000) (indicating error
to simultaneously amend complaint and judgment to automatically impose liability on new
defendant).
158. See Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 234–35, 235 n.5 (1964) (citing
FED. R. CIV. P. 1) (finding the district court has discretion to deny excessive witness costs
assessed against losing party).
159. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S.
522, 542, 546 (1987) (resorting to international convention to conduct discovery overseas
not required instead of other discovery devices subject to judicial supervision); Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176–77 (1979) (emphasizing dictum on broad power of court to
control discovery in libel case brought by public figure).
160. See Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 27 (1986) (discussing Rule 15(c) on
relation back of amendments to a complaint); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S.
346, 355–57 (1981) (explaining Rule 68 on offers of judgment). For further discussion of
these cases, see Johnston, supra note 23, at 1359–72.

26

POST RUTHERGLEN PAGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 56: 1, 2019]

3/5/2019 11:14 AM

The Problem with Procedure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

override the commands of the Due Process Clause;161 it does not detract from
the broad control that judges exercise over discovery and costs;162 and it
does not supersede the specific terms of other rules.163 Yet these appearances
of the rule are as important for what they do not say as for what they do.
None of these decisions work simply to liberalize procedure, let alone
systematically reduce the burdens on plaintiffs. Instead, as Bone has said,
the lower courts recently “have used Rule 1 to justify restricting discovery,
screening frivolous suits more aggressively, promoting settlement more
strongly, and managing cases more actively.”164
That use of the rule may explain how it fits with the recent decisions,
Twombly and Iqbal, on pleading under the Federal Rules. Rule 1 did make
an appearance in the second of these cases, but only by way of its sentence
on the scope of the rules: that they applied uniformly to “all civil actions.”165
This provision led the Court to conclude that all pleadings, whether in
antitrust actions like Twombly or civil rights actions like Iqbal, must meet
the new standard of plausibility. The Court recognized that the Federal
Rules rejected “the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era,”166
but critics of the decisions nevertheless have argued that it reinstated these
technicalities by another name under the heading of “plausibility.”167 These
criticisms were framed in terms that could have come right out of Rule 1:
that the stricter standard increases the cost of litigation and results in the
dismissal of meritorious cases, with only marginal gains in the speedy
disposition of cases.168 Empirical studies have yet to prove this claim,
although almost all find some negative effect on plaintiffs resulting from
these decisions.169 While the jury remains out on the wisdom of Twombly
161. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Nelson, 529 U.S. at 465.
162. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 176–77.
163. See Société Nationale, 482 U.S. at 542–43.
164. Bone, supra note 17, at 298–99; see also Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Katherine Lehe,
Uncovering Discovery, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 6–22 (2011) (summarizing cases relying
upon Rule 1 to increase judicial control over litigation, especially discovery); Johnston,
supra note 23, at 1349–52, 1375–81 (discussing inconsistent use of Rule 1 by lower courts).
165. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
166. Id. at 678.
167. DODSON, supra note 99, at 55, 79 (identifying justice effects and cost effects of
Twombly and Iqbal).
168. Id. at 79.
169. See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study
of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1213–33 (2013) (analyzing strengths and
weakness of empirical studies of Twombly and Iqbal); see also DODSON, supra note 99, at
83–106.
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and Iqbal as policy, the justices have clearly spoken on the balance of
factors identified in Rule 1: “speedy” and “inexpensive” should have more
weight, even if “just” retains the value it always had.170
The critics rightly sense that a different balance would have been struck
by the original rulemakers.171 But those same rulemakers invited just this
kind of rebalancing by the terms of Rule 1 itself. Where they envisaged
discretion by the district judge to be exercised in favor of liberality, the
current Supreme Court takes the opposite view.172 Seen in that light, Twombly
and Iqbal simply extend the approach of Celotex from summary judgment
to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Screening out weak cases,
so far as the pleadings can disclose them, now has acquired renewed urgency.
This step does not, contrary to the critics of these decisions, return procedure
to the regime of common law pleading. No particular form of words would
have saved the complaints in Twombly and Iqbal—only allegations that could
have been supported by further knowledge of the facts. The decisions raise
the 21st century problem of asymmetrical access to evidence, not the 19th
century problem of differential decisions based on counsel’s skill as a
writ-writer.173 The Court might well have offered the wrong solution to
the current problem, but its mistake was not in adopting the solution to the
old problem. At several points in Twombly174 and Iqbal, the Court confronted
the cost of obtaining further evidence through discovery and made a
determination that it was not worth the benefit in the absence of plausible
pleading in the complaint.175 The Court might well have guessed wrong
in making this determination, and it might have aggravated its mistake by
inviting other judges to guess wrong by asking them to assess plausibility
based on judicial “experience and common sense.”176 Further studies might
confirm such assertions, but, even if they do, they hardly establish that the
Court reached results fundamentally at odds with the Federal Rules when
it balanced factors that the rules themselves single out as controlling.
This is not to make Rule 1 part of the solution. It is part of the problem,
not least because it can be cited on either side of the current controversy
over pleading. Speed, expense, and justice all cut both ways on the desirability

170. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
171. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice
of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1972–74 (1989) (noting the aim of the framers
of the rules to sweep away technicalities of pleading with new rules).
172. See Bone, supra note 17, at 294, 297.
173. See DODSON, supra note 99, at 108–11 (explaining that new pleading requirements
tend to screen out cases in which plaintiffs lack crucial information in the possession of
defendants).
174. See 550 U.S. 544, 546–47 (2007).
175. 556 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2009).
176. Id. at 663–64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
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of screening cases more thoroughly before proceeding to discovery. The
capacity of the rules to change, ideally by amendments after thorough study
of the possible consequences, has diminished in recent decades. As with
the current proposal to repeal the authorized forms for sufficient pleading,
amendments to the rules follow interpretation rather than lead them. Rule
1 might be justified as a candid admission of the full range of conflicting
considerations that must enter into any kind of procedural reform, but it
offers too little guidance about how to analyze those conflicting considerations.
Leaving the decision to the discretion of the courts, either at the trial level
in administering the rules or at the appellate level in construing the rules,
does not do enough to fill in the affirmative requirements of any workable
procedural system. Rule 1 encapsulates the conflicting ambitions of procedural
reform without doing enough to resolve the tensions between them.
VI. CONCLUSION
Charles Clark and the other framers of the Federal Rules offered a vision
of procedure that has much to recommend it. Their fundamental insight—
that past procedural forms may no longer serve present purposes—still
has force today, and in many respects, it has outlived the particular reforms
that it succeeded in bringing about. At the beginning of the bureaucratic
age, the rulemakers could see the potential in judicial discretion to replace
the outworn technicalities of the common law. After many decades under
the Federal Rules, that postulate deserves to be re-examined, and to some
extent it has, in the proliferation of detailed provisions in the rules themselves.
The immediate aim of Rule 1 in superseding the technicalities of common
law procedure has long since been accomplished, and with it, any need for
judges to rely on this provision, or any other in the rules, as a source of
freestanding values and unlimited discretion. Neither Rule 1, nor the Federal
Rules as a whole, should any longer be taken to endorse a model of
discretionary justice.
Rules laid down by appellate courts or derived from substantive law, as
the rulemakers themselves recognized, can also define and limit judicial
discretion. These decisions confirm the broad discretion that judges possess
over procedure, but not at the trial level alone or through unstructured
balancing of ultimate goals of a procedural system. Clark’s instrumental
approach to procedure—as the means to ends defined elsewhere—
presupposes that those ends can be brought to bear in more structured and
definite form. They include the substantive rights that he emphasized and
the procedural rights, such as notice and opportunity to be heard, that he
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tacitly accepted. If anything, the generation of legal scholars that followed
him went too far in rejecting this insight, away from an instrumental theory
toward independent procedural values. Process theorists saw procedure
as the solution to too many problems.177 They inadvertently demonstrated
the opposite of what they sought to prove: not the power of general procedural
theory, but its emptiness. The more abstract it becomes, the less guidance
it has to offer.
Seen in this light, Rule 1 is just a prominent example of the diminishing
returns from increasingly abstract procedural theory. Instead of looking
for a thick theory of procedure that answers all the questions raised by
litigation in the bureaucratic state, we would do well to look for a thin
theory—one that takes its goals from values that have roots in substantive
law and the right to notice and opportunity to be heard. The exercise of
judicial discretion within a procedural code has to be informed by sources
outside it, if judges are not to lose their way in abstractions that are otherwise
impossible to pin down. Clark’s instrumental vision of procedure, suitably
qualified, offers this fundamental insight. A critical look at Rule 1 shows us
how to get there, and to get beyond the terms of the rule itself.

177. The classic statement is in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 4 (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994):
The alternative to disintegrating resort to violence is the establishment of regularized
and peaceable methods of decision. The principle of institutional settlement
expresses the judgment that decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly
established procedures of this kind ought to be accepted as binding upon the
whole society unless and until they are duly changed.
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